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Abstract
Despite achieving impressive performance, state-of-the-art classifiers remain highly
vulnerable to small, imperceptible, adversarial perturbations. This vulnerability
has proven empirically to be very intricate to address. In this paper, we study the
phenomenon of adversarial perturbations under the assumption that the data is
generated with a smooth generative model. We derive fundamental upper bounds
on the robustness to perturbations of any classification function, and prove the
existence of adversarial perturbations that transfer well across different classifiers
with small risk. Our analysis of the robustness also provides insights onto key
properties of generative models, such as their smoothness and dimensionality of
latent space. We conclude with numerical experimental results showing that our
bounds provide informative baselines to the maximal achievable robustness on
several datasets.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks are powerful models that achieve state-of-the-art performance across several
domains, such as bioinformatics [1, 2], speech [3], and computer vision [4, 5]. Though deep networks
have exhibited very good performance in classification tasks, they have recently been shown to be
unstable to adversarial perturbations of the data [6, 7]. In fact, very small and often imperceptible
perturbations of the data samples are sufficient to fool state-of-the-art classifiers and result in incorrect
classification. This discovery of the surprising vulnerability of classifiers to perturbations has led to a
large body of work that attempts to design robust classifiers [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. However, advances
in designing robust classifiers have been accompanied with stronger perturbation schemes that defeat
such defenses [14, 15, 16].
In this paper, we assume that the data distribution is defined by a smooth generative model (map-
ping latent representations to images), and study theoretically the existence of small adversarial
perturbations for arbitrary classifiers. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We show fundamental upper bounds on the robustness of any classifier to perturbations,
which provides a baseline to the maximal achievable robustness. When the latent space of
the data distribution is high dimensional, our analysis shows that any classifier is vulnerable
to very small perturbations. Our results further suggest the existence of a tight relation
between robustness and linearity of the classifier in the latent space.
• We prove the existence of adversarial perturbations that transfer across different classifiers.
This provides theoretical justification to previous empirical findings that highlighted the
existence of such transferable perturbations.
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• We quantify the difference between the robustness to adversarial examples in the data mani-
fold and unconstrained adversarial examples, and show that the two notions of robustness
can be precisely related: for any classifier f with in-distribution robustness r, there exists a
classifier f˜ that achieves unconstrained robustness r/2. This further provides support to the
empirical observations in [17, 18].
• We evaluate our bounds in several experimental setups (CIFAR-10 and SVHN), and show
that they yield informative baselines to the maximal achievable robustness.
Our robustness analysis provides in turn insights onto desirable properties of generative models
capturing real-world distributions. In particular, the intriguing generality of our analysis implies that
when the data distribution is modeled through a smooth and generative model with high-dimensional
latent space, there exist small-norm perturbations of images that fool humans for any discriminative
task defined on the data distribution. If, on the other hand, it is the case that the human visual
system is inherently robust to small perturbations (e.g., in `p norm), then our analysis shows that
a distribution over natural images cannot be modeled by smooth and high-dimensional generative
models. Going forward in modeling complex natural image distributions, our results hence suggest
that low dimensional, non-smooth generative models are important constraints to capture the real-
world distribution of images; not satisfying such constraints can lead to small adversarial perturbations
for any classifier, including the human visual system.
2 Related work
It was proven in [19, 20] that for certain families of classifiers, there exist adversarial perturbations
that cause misclassification of magnitude O(1/
√
d), where d is the data dimension, provided the
robustness to random noise is fixed (which is typically the case if e.g., the data is normalized). In
addition, fundamental limits on the robustness of classifiers were derived in [19] for some simple
classification families. Other works have instead studied the existence of adversarial perturbations,
under strong assumptions on the data distribution [18, 21]. In this work, motivated by the success
of generative models mapping latent representations with a normal prior, we instead study the
existence of robust classifiers under this general data-generating procedure and derive bounds on
the robustness that hold for any classification function. A large number of techniques have recently
been proposed to improve the robustness of classifiers to perturbations, such as adversarial training
[8], robust optimization [9, 10], regularization [11], distillation [12], stochastic networks [13], etc...
Unfortunately, such techniques have been shown to fail whenever a more complex attack strategy is
used [14, 15], or when it is evaluated on a more complex dataset. Other works have recently studied
procedures and algorithms to provably guarantee a certain level of robustness [22, 23, 24, 25, 26],
and have been applied to small datasets (e.g., MNIST). For large scale, high dimensional datasets, the
problem of designing robust classifiers is entirely open. We finally note that adversarial examples for
generative models have recently been considered in [27]; our aim here is however different as our
goal is to bound the robustness of classifiers when data comes from a generative model.
3 Definitions and notations
Let g be a generative model that maps latent vectors z ∈ Z := Rd to the space of images X := Rm,
with m denoting the number of pixels. To generate an image according to the distribution of natural
images µ, we generate a random vector z ∼ ν according to the standard Gaussian distribution
ν = N (0, Id), and we apply the map g; the resulting image is then g(z). This data-generating
procedure is motivated by numerous previous works on generative models, whereby natural-looking
images are obtained by transforming normal vectors through a deep neural network [28], [29], [30],
[31], [32].2 Let f : Rm → {1, . . . ,K} be a classifier mapping images in Rm to discrete labels
{1, . . . ,K}. The discriminator f partitions X into K sets Ci = {x ∈ X : f(x) = i} each of which
corresponds to a different predicted label. The relative proportion of points in class i is equal to
P(Ci) = ν(g−1(Ci)), the Gaussian measure of g−1(Ci) in Z .
2Instead of sampling fromN (0, Id) in Z , some generative models sample from the uniform distribution in
[−1, 1]d. The results of this paper can be easily extended to such generative procedures.
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The goal of this paper is to study the robustness of f to additive perturbations under the assumption
that the data is generated according to g. We define two notions of robustness. These effectively
measure the minimum distance one has to travel in image space to change the classification decision.
• In-distribution robustness: For x = g(z), we define the in-distribution robustness rin(x)
as follows:
rin(x) = min
r∈Z
‖g(z + r)− x‖ s.t. f(g(z + r)) 6= f(x),
where ‖ · ‖ denotes an arbitrary norm on X . Note that the perturbed image, g(z + r) is
constrained to lie in the image of g, and hence belongs to the support of the distribution µ.
• Unconstrained robustness: Unlike the in-distribution setting, we measure here the ro-
bustness to arbitrary perturbations in the image space; that is, the perturbed image is not
constrained anymore to belong to the data distribution µ.
runc(x) = min
r∈X
‖r‖ s.t. f(x+ r) 6= f(x).
This notion of robustness corresponds to the widely used definition of adversarial pertur-
bations. It is easy to see that this robustness definition is smaller than the in-distribution
robustness; i.e., runc(x) ≤ rin(x).
In this paper, we assume that the generative model is smooth, in the sense that it satisfies a modulus
of continuity property, defined as follows:
Assumption 1. We assume that g admits a monotone invertible modulus of continuity ω; i.e.,3
∀z, z′ ∈ Z, ‖g(z)− g(z′)‖ ≤ ω(‖z − z′‖2). (1)
Note that the above assumption is milder than assuming Lipschitz continuity. In fact, the Lipschitz
property corresponds to choosing ω(t) to be a linear function of t. In particular, the above assumption
does not require that ω(0) = 0, which potentially allows us to model distributions with disconnected
support.4
It should be noted that generator smoothness is a desirable property of generative models. This
property is often illustrated empirically by generating images along a straight path in the latent space
[30], and verifying that the images undergo gradual semantic changes between the two endpoints. In
fact, smooth transitions is often used as a qualitative evidence that the generator has learned relevant
factors of variation.
Fig. 1 summarizes the problem setting and notations. Assuming that the data is generated according
to g, we analyze in the remainder of the paper the robustness of arbitrary classifiers to perturbations.
4 Analysis of the robustness to perturbations
4.1 Upper bounds on robustness
We state a general bound on the robustness to perturbations and derive two special cases to make
more explicit the dependence on the distribution and number of classes.
Theorem 1. Let f : Rm → {1, . . . ,K} be an arbitrary classification function defined on the image
space. Then, the fraction of datapoints having robustness less than η satisfies:
P (rin(x) ≤ η) ≥
K∑
i=1
(Φ(a6=i + ω−1(η))− Φ(a6=i)) , (2)
where Φ is the cdf of N (0, 1), and a 6=i = Φ−1
(
P
(⋃
j 6=i
Cj
))
.
3This assumption can be extended to random z (see C.2 in the appendix). For ease of exposition however, we
use here the deterministic assumption.
4In this paper, we use the term smooth generative models to denote that the function ω(δ) takes small values
for small δ.
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Figure 1: Setting used in this paper. The data distribution is obtained by mapping N (0, Id) through
g (we set d = 1 and g(z) = (cos(2piz), sin(2piz)) in this example). The thick circle indicates the
support of the data distribution µ in Rm (m = 2 here). The binary discriminative function f separates
the data space into two classification regions (red and blue colors). While the in-distribution perturbed
image is required to belong to the data support, this is not necessarily the case in the unconstrained
setting. In this paper, we do not put any assumption on f , resulting in potentially arbitrary partitioning
of the data space. While the existence of very small adversarial perturbations seems counter-intuitive
in this low-dimensional illustrative example (i.e., rin and runc can be large for some choices of f ), we
show in the next sections that this is the case in high dimensions.
In particular, if for all i, P(Ci) ≤ 12 (the classes are not too unbalanced), we have
P (rin(x) ≤ η) ≥ 1−
√
pi
2
e−ω
−1(η)2/2 . (3)
To see the dependence on the number of classes more explicitly, consider the setting where the classes
are equiprobable, i.e., P(Ci) = 1K for all i, K ≥ 5, then
P (rin(x) ≤ η) ≥ 1−
√
pi
2
e−ω
−1(η)2/2e
−η
√
log
(
K2
4pi log(K)
)
. (4)
This theorem is a consequence of the Gaussian isoperimetric inequality first proved in [33] and [34].
The proofs can be found in the appendix.
Remark 1. Interpretation. For easiness of interpretation, we assume that the function g is Lipschitz
continuous, in which case ω−1(η) is replaced with η/L where L is the Lipschitz constant. Then,
Eq. (3) shows the existence of perturbations of norm η ∝ L that can fool any classifier. This
norm should be compared to the typical norm given by E‖g(z)‖. By normalizing the data, we
can assume E‖g(z)‖ = E‖z‖2 without loss of generality.5 As z has a normal distribution, we
have E‖z‖2 ∈ [
√
d− 1,√d] and thus the typical norm of an element in the data set satisfies
E‖g(z)‖ ≥ √d− 1. Now if we plug in η = 2L, we obtain that the robustness is less than 2L with
probability exceeding 0.8. This should be compared to the typical norm which is at least
√
d− 1. Our
result therefore shows that when d is large and g is smooth (in the sense that L √d), there exist
small adversarial perturbations that can fool arbitrary classifiers f . Fig. 2 provides an illustration of
the upper bound, in the case where ω is the identity function.
Remark 2. Dependence on K. Theorem 1 shows an increasing probability of misclassification with
the number of classes K. In other words, it is easier to find adversarial perturbations in the setting
where the number of classes is large, than for a binary classification task.6 This dependence confirms
empirical results whereby the robustness is observed to decrease with the number of classes. The
dependence on K captured in our bounds is in contrast to previous bounds that showed decreasing
probability of fooling the classifier, for larger number of classes [20].
Remark 3. Classification-agnostic bound. Our bounds hold for any classification function f , and
are not specific to a family of classifiers. This is unlike the work of [19] that establishes bounds on
the robustness for specific classes of functions (e.g., linear or quadratic classifiers).
5Without this assumption, the following discussion applies if we replace the Lipschitz constant with the
normalized Lipschitz constant L′ = L E‖z‖2E‖g(z)‖ .
6We assume here equiprobable classes.
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Remark 4. How tight is the upper bound on robustness in Theorem 1? Assuming that the
smoothness assumption in Eq. 1 is an equality, let the classifier f be such that f ◦ g separates the
latent space into B1 = g−1(C1) = {z : z1 ≥ 0} and B2 = g−1(C2) = {z : z1 < 0}. Then, it
follows that
P(rin(x)) ≤ η) = P(∃r : ‖g(z + r)− g(z)‖ ≤ η, f(g(z + r)) 6= f(g(z))))
= P(∃r : ‖r‖2 ≤ ω−1(η), sgn(z1 + r1)sgn(z1) < 0)
= P(z ∈ B1, z1 < ω−1(η)) + P(z ∈ B2, z1 ≥ −ω−1(η)) = 2(Φ(ω−1(η))− Φ(0)),
which precisely corresponds to Eq. (2). In this case, the bound in Eq. (2) is therefore an equality.
More generally, this bound is an equality if the classifier induces linearly separable regions in the
latent space.7 This suggests that classifiers are maximally robust when the induced classification
boundaries in the latent space are linear. We stress on the fact that boundaries in the Z-space can be
very different from the boundaries in the image space. In particular, as g is in general non-linear, f
might be a highly non-linear function of the input space, while z 7→ (f ◦ g)(z) is a linear function in
z. We provide an explicit example in the appendix illustrating this remark.
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Figure 2: Upper bound (Theorem 1) on the median of the normalized robustness rin/
√
d for different
values of the number of classes K, in the setting where ω(t) = t. We assume that classes have equal
measure (i.e., P(Ci) = 1/K).
Remark 5. Adversarial perturbations in the latent space While the quantities introduced in
Section 3 measure the robustness in the image space, an alternative is to measure the robustness in
the latent space, defined as rZ = minr ‖r‖2 s.t. f(g(z + r)) 6= f(g(z)). For natural images, latent
vectors provide a decomposition of images into meaningful factors of variation, such as features
of objects in the image, illumination, etc... Hence, perturbations of vectors in the latent space
measure the amount of change one needs to apply to such meaningful latent features to cause data
misclassification. A bound on the magnitude of the minimal perturbation in the latent space (i.e., rZ )
can be directly obtained from Theorem 1 by setting ω to identity (i.e., ω(t) = t). Importantly, note
that no assumptions on the smoothness of the generator g are required for our bounds to hold when
considering this notion of robustness.
Relation between in-distribution robustness and unconstrained robustness.
While the previous bound is specifically looking at the in-distribution robustness, in many cases, we
are interested in achieving unconstrained robustness; that is, the perturbed image is not constrained
to belong to the data distribution (or equivalently to the range of g). It is easy to see that any
bound derived for the in-distribution robustness rin(x) also holds for the unconstrained robustness
runc(x) since it clearly holds that runc(x) ≤ rin(x). One may wonder whether it is possible to get
a better upper bound on runc(x) directly. We show here that this is not possible if we require our
bound to hold for any general classifier. Specifically, we construct a family of classifiers for which
runc(x) ≥ 12rin(x), which we now present:
7In the case where Eq. (1) is an inequality, we will not exactly achieve the bound, but get closer to it when
f ◦ g is linear.
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For a given classifier f in the image space, define the classifier f˜ constructed in a nearest neighbour
strategy:
f˜(x) = f(g(z∗)) with z∗ = arg min
z
‖g(z)− x‖. (5)
Note that f˜ behaves exactly in the same way as f on the image of g (in particular, it has the same risk
and in-distribution robustness). We show here that it has an unconstrained robustness that is at least
half of the in-distribution robustness of f .
Theorem 2. For the classifier f˜ , we have runc(x) ≥ 12rin(x).
This result shows that if a classifier has in-distribution robustness r, then we can construct a classifier
with unconstrained robustness r/2, through a simple modification of the original classifier f . Hence,
classification-agnostic limits derived for both notions of robustness are essentially the same. It
should further be noted that the procedure in Eq. (5) provides a constructive method to increase the
robustness of any classifier to unconstrained perturbations. Such a nearest neighbour strategy is useful
when the in-distribution robustness is much larger than the unconstrained robustness, and permits the
latter to match the former. This approach has recently been found to be successful in increasing the
robustness of classifiers when accurate generative models can be learned in [35]. Other techniques
[17] build on this approach, and further use methods to increase the in-distribution robustness.
4.2 Transferability of perturbations
One of the most intriguing properties about adversarial perturbations is their transferability [6, 36]
across different models. Under our data model distribution, we study the existence of transferable
adversarial perturbations, and show that two models with approximately zero risk will have shared
adversarial perturbations.
Theorem 3 (Transferability of perturbations). Let f, h be two classifiers. Assume that P(f ◦ g(z) 6=
h ◦ g(z)) ≤ δ (e.g., if f and h have a risk bounded by δ/2 for the data set generated by g). In
addition, assume that P(Ci(f)) + δ ≤ 12 for all i.8 Then,
P
{
∃v : ‖v‖2 ≤ η and f(g(z) + v) 6= f(g(z))h(g(z) + v) 6= h(g(z))
}
≥ 1−
√
pi
2
e−ω
−1(η)2/2 − 2δ.
(6)
Compared to Theorem 1 which bounds the robustness to adversarial perturbations, the extra price to
pay here to find transferable adversarial perturbations is the 2δ term, which is small if the risk of
both classifiers is small. Hence, our bounds provide a theoretical explanation for the existence of
transferable adversarial perturbations, which were previously shown to exist in [6, 36]. The existence
of transferable adversarial perturbations across several models with small risk has important security
implications, as adversaries can, in principle, fool different classifiers with a single, classifier-agnostic,
perturbation. The existence of such perturbations significantly reduces the difficulty of attacking
(potentially black box) machine learning models.
4.3 Approximate generative model
In the previous results, we have assumed that the data distribution is exactly described by the
generative model g (i.e., µ = g∗(ν) where g∗(ν) is the pushforward of ν via g). However, in many
cases, such generative models only provide an approximation to the true data distribution µ. In
this section, we specifically assume that the generated distribution g∗(ν) provides an approximation
to the true underlying distribution in the 1-Wasserstein sense on the metric space (X , ‖ · ‖); i.e.,
W (g∗(ν), µ) ≤ δ, and derive upper bounds on the robustness. This assumption is in line with
recent advances in generative models, whereby the generator provides a good approximation (in
the Wasserstein sense) to the true distribution, but does not exactly fit it [31]. We show here that
similar upper bounds on the robustness (in expectation) hold, as long as g∗(ν) provides an accurate
approximation of the true distribution µ.
8This assumption is only to simplify the statement, a general statement can be easily derived in the same way.
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Theorem 4. We use the same notations as in Theorem 1. Assume that the generator g provides a δ
approximation of the true distribution µ in the 1-Wasserstein sense on the metric space (X , ‖ · ‖);
that is, W (g∗(ν), µ) ≤ δ (where g∗(ν) is the pushforward of ν via g), the following inequality holds
provided ω is concave
E
x∼µrunc(x) ≤ ω
(
K∑
i=1
−a6=iΦ(−a6=i) + e
−a26=i/2√
2pi
)
+ δ,
where runc(x) is the unconstrained robustness in the image space. In particular, for K ≥ 5 equiprob-
able classes, we have
E
x∼µrunc(x) ≤ ω
(
log(4pi log(K))√
2 log(K)
)
+ δ.
In words, when the data is defined according to a distribution which can be approximated by a
smooth, high-dimensional generative model, our results show that arbitrary classifiers will have small
adversarial examples in expectation. We also note that as K grows, this bound decreases and even
goes to zero under the sole condition that ω is continuous at 0. Note however that the decrease is
slow as it is only logarithmic.
5 Experimental evaluation
We now evaluate our bounds on the SVHN dataset [37] which contains color images of house numbers,
and the task is to classify the digit at the center of the image. In all this section, computations of
perturbations are done using the algorithm in [38].9 The dataset contains 73, 257 training images, and
26, 032 test images (we do not use the images in the ’extra’ set). We train a DCGAN [30] generative
model on this dataset, with a latent vector dimension d = 100, and further consider several neural
networks architectures for classification.10 For each classifier, the empirical robustness is compared
to our upper bound.11 In addition to reporting the in-distribution and unconstrained robustness, we
also report the robustness in the latent space: rZ = minr ‖r‖2 s.t. f(g(z + r)) 6= f(g(z)). For this
robustness setting, note that the upper bound exactly corresponds to Theorem 1 with ω set to the
identity map. Results are reported in Table 1.
Observe first that the upper bound on the robustness in the latent space is of the same order of
magnitude as the empirical robustness computed in the Z-space, for the different tested classifiers.
This suggests that the isoperimetric inequality (which is the only source of inequality in our bound,
when factoring out smoothness) provides a reasonable baseline that is on par with the robustness of
best classifiers. In the image space, the theoretical prediction from our classifier-agnostic bounds
is one order of magnitude larger than the empirical estimates. Note however that our bound is still
non-vacuous, as it predicts the norm of the required perturbation to be approximately 1/3 of the
norm of images (i.e., normalized robustness of 0.36). This potentially leaves room for improving
the robustness in the image space. Moreover, we believe that the bound on the robustness in the
image space is not tight (unlike the bound in the Z space) as the smoothness assumption on g can be
conservative.
Further comparisons of the figures between in-distribution and unconstrained robustness in the image
space interestingly show that for the simple LeNet architecture, a large gap exists between these
two quantities. However, by using more complex classifiers (ResNet-18 and ResNet-101), the gap
between in-distribution and unconstrained robustness gets smaller. Recall that Theorem 2 says that
any classifier can be modified in a way that the in-distribution robustness and unconstrained robustness
only differ by a factor 2, while preserving the accuracy. But this modification may result in a more
9Note that in order to estimate robustness quantities (e.g., rin), we do not need the ground truth label, as the
definition only involves the change of the estimated label. Estimation of the robustness can therefore be readily
done for automatically generated images.
10For the SVHN and CIFAR-10 experiments, we show examples of generated images and perturbed images in
the appendix (Section C.3). Moreover, we provide in C.1 details on the architectures of the used models.
11To evaluate numerically the upper bound, we have used a probabilistic version of the modulus of continuity,
where the property is not required to be satisfied for all z, z′, but rather with high probability, and accounted for
the error probability in the bound. We refer to the appendix for the detailed optimization used to estimate the
smoothness parameters.
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Upper bound
on robustness 2-Layer LeNet ResNet-18 ResNet-101
Error rate - 11% 4.8% 4.2 %
Robustness in the Z-space 16× 10−3 6.1× 10−3 6.1× 10−3 6.6× 10−3
In-distribution robustness 36× 10−2 3.3× 10−2 3.1× 10−2 3.1× 10−2
Unconstrained robustness 36× 10−2 0.39× 10−2 1.1× 10−2 1.4× 10−2
Table 1: Experiments on SVHN dataset. We report the 25% percentile of the normalized robustness
at each cell, where probabilities are computed either theoretically (for the upper bound) or empirically.
More precisely, we report the following quantities for the upper bound column: For the robustness
in the Z space, we report t/E(‖z‖2) such that P (minr ‖r‖2 s.t. f(g(z + r)) 6= f(g(z)) ≤ t) ≥
0.25, using Theorem 1 with ω taken as identity. For the robustness in image-space, we report
t/E(‖g(z)‖2) such that P (rin(x) ≤ t) ≥ 0.25, using Theorem 1, with ω estimated empirically
(Section C.2 in appendix).
Upper bound
on robustness VGG [40] Wide ResNet [41]
Wide ResNet
+ Adv. training
[10, 15]
Error rate - 5.5% 3.9% 16.0%
Robustness in the Z-space 0.016 2.5× 10−3 3.0× 10−3 3.6× 10−3
In-distribution robustness 0.10 4.8× 10−3 5.9× 10−3 8.3× 10−3
Unconstrained robustness 0.10 0.23× 10−3 0.20× 10−3 2.0× 10−3
Table 2: Experiments on CIFAR-10 (same setting as in Table 1). See appendix for details about
models.
complicated classifier compared to the original one; for example starting with a linear classifier, the
modified classifier will in general not be linear. This interestingly matches with our numerical values
for this experiment, as the multiplicative gap between in-distribution and unconstrained robustness
approaches 2 as we make the classification function more complex (e.g., in-distribution robustness of
3.1× 10−2 and out-distribution 1.4× 10−2 for ResNet-101).
We now consider the more complex CIFAR-10 dataset [39]. The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 10
classes of 32× 32 color natural images. Similarly to the previous experiment, we used a DCGAN
generative model with d = 100, and tested the robustness of state-of-the-art deep neural network
classifiers. Quantitative results are reported in Table 2. Our bounds notably predict that any classifier
defined on this task will have perturbations not exceeding 1/10 of the norm of the image, for 25% of
the datapoints in the distribution. Note that using the PGD adversarial training strategy of [10] (which
constitutes one of the most robust models to date [15]), the robustness is significantly improved,
despite still being ∼ 1 order of magnitude smaller than the baseline of 0.1 for the in-distribution
robustness. The construction of more robust classifiers, alongside better empirical estimates of the
quantities involved in the bound/improved bounds will hopefully lead to a convergence of these two
quantities, hence guaranteeing optimality of the robustness of our classifiers.
6 Discussion
We have shown the existence of a baseline robustness that no classifier can surpass, whenever the
distribution is approximable by a generative model mapping latent representations to images. The
bounds lead to informative numerical results: for example, on the CIFAR-10 task (with a DCGAN
approximator), our upper bound shows that a significant portion of datapoints can be fooled with
a perturbation of magnitude 10% that of an image. Existing classifiers however do not match the
derived upper bound. Moving forward, we expect the design of more robust classifiers to get closer
to this upper bound. The existence of a baseline robustness is fundamental in that context in order to
measure the progress made and compare to the optimal robustness we can hope to achieve.
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In addition to providing a baseline, this work has several practical implications on the robustness
front. To construct classifiers with better robustness, our analysis suggests that these should have
linear decision boundaries in the latent space; in particular, classifiers with multiple disconnected
classification regions will be more prone to small perturbations. We further provided a constructive
way to provably close the gap between unconstrained robustness and in-distribution robustness.
Our analysis at the intersection of classifiers’ robustness and generative modeling has further led
to insights onto generative models, due to its intriguing generality. If we take as a premise that
human visual system classifiers require large-norm perturbations to be fooled (which is implicitly
assumed in many works on adversarial robustness, though see [42]), our work shows that natural
image distributions cannot be modeled as very high dimensional and smooth mappings. While
current dimensions used for the latent space (e.g., d = 100) do not lead to any contradiction with
this assumption (as upper bounds are sufficiently large), moving to higher dimensions for more
complex datasets might lead to very small bounds. To model such datasets, the prior distribution,
smoothness and dimension properties should therefore be carefully set to avoid contradictions with
the premise. For example, conditional generative models can be seen as non-smooth generative
models, as different generating functions are used for each class. We finally note that the derived
results do bound the norm of the perturbation, and not the human perceptibility, which is much harder
to quantify. We leave it as an open question to derive bounds on more perceptual metrics.
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A Proofs
A.1 Useful results
Recall that we write the cumulative distribution function for the standard Gaussian distribution
Φ(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ e
−u2/2du. We state the Gaussian isoperimetric inequality [33, 34], the main
technical tool used in to prove the results in this paper.
Theorem 5 (Gaussian isoperimetric inequality). Let νd be the Gaussian measure on Rd. Let A ⊆ Rd
and let Aη = {z ∈ Rd : ∃z′ ∈ A s.t. ‖z − z′‖2 ≤ η}. If νd(A) = Φ(a) then νd(Aη) ≥ Φ(a+ η).
We then state some useful bounds on the cumulative distribution function for the Gaussian distribution
Φ.
Lemma 1 (see e.g., [43]). We have for x ≥ 0,
1− e
−x2/2
√
2pi
2
x+
√
x2 + 8/pi
≤ Φ(x) ≤ 1− e
−x2/2
√
2pi
2
x+
√
x2 + 4
. (7)
Lemma 2. Let p ∈ [1/2, 1], we have for all η > 0,
Φ(Φ−1(p) + η) ≥ 1− (1− p)
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2e−ηΦ
−1(p) . (8)
If p = 1− 1K for K ≥ 5 and η ≥ 1, we have
Φ(Φ−1(1− 1
K
) + η) ≥ 1− 1
K
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2e
−η
√
log
(
K2
4pi log(K)
)
. (9)
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Proof. As p ≥ 1/2, we have Φ−1(p) ≥ 0. Thus,
Φ(Φ−1(p) + η) ≥ 1− 1√
2pi
2e−(Φ
−1(p)+η)2/2
Φ−1(p) + η +
√
(Φ−1(p) + η)2 + 8/pi
= 1− 1√
2pi
2e−Φ
−1(p)2/2−η2/2−ηΦ−1(p)
Φ−1(p) + η +
√
(Φ−1(p) + η)2 + 8/pi
= 1−
(
1√
2pi
2e−Φ
−1(p)2/2
Φ−1(p) +
√
Φ−1(p)2 + 4
)
× Φ
−1(p) +
√
Φ−1(p)2 + 4
Φ−1(p) + η +
√
(Φ−1(p) + η)2 + 8/pi
e−η
2/2−ηΦ−1(p) .
Now we use the fact that(
1√
2pi
2e−Φ
−1(p)2/2
Φ−1(p) +
√
Φ−1(p)2 + 4
)
≤ 1− Φ(Φ−1(p)) = 1− p .
As a result,
Φ(Φ−1(p) + η)
≥ 1− (1− p)e−η2/2−ηΦ−1(p) Φ
−1(p) +
√
Φ−1(p)2 + 4
Φ−1(p) + η +
√
(Φ−1(p) + η)2 + 8/pi
≥ 1− (1− p)e−η2/2−ηΦ−1(p) Φ
−1(p) +
√
Φ−1(p)2 + 4
Φ−1(p) +
√
Φ−1(p)2 + 8/pi
≥ 1− (1− p)e−η2/2e−ηΦ−1(p)
√
4√
8/pi
.
In the case p = 1− 1K , it suffices to show that that for K ≥ 5, we have
Φ−1(1− 1/K) ≥
√
log
(
K2
4pi log(K)
)
. (10)
Using the upper bound in (7), and the fact that x +
√
x2 + 2 ≤ 2√x2 + 1, it suffices to show that
1
2
e−x
2
√
pi
√
x2+1
≥ 1K where x =
√
1
2 log
(
K2
4pi log(K)
)
. This inequality is equivalent to showing that√
log(K) ≥ √x2 + 1 for the same value of x. If we let u = log(K) this amounts to showing that
√
u ≥
√
u− 12 log(4piu) + 1 for all u ≥ log(5). For such u one can verify that− 12 log(4piu)+1 ≤ 0
and so clearly the inequality is satisfied.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. To prove the general bound in Eq. (2), we define
Ci→ = {x ∈ Ci : dist(x,∪j 6=iCj) ≤ η}.
Here, dist(x,C) is defined as infx′∈C ‖x − x′‖. Let us also introduce the following sets in the
z-space: Bi = g−1(Ci) and Bi→ = {z ∈ Bi : dist(z,∪j 6=iBj) ≤ ω−1(η)}. It is easy to verify that
g(Bi→) ⊆ Ci→. Thus we have P(Ci→) = ν(g−1(Ci→)) ≥ ν(Bi→). Now note that Bi→
⋃∪j 6=iBj
is nothing but the set of points that are at distance at most ω−1(η) from ∪j 6=iBj . As such, by the
Gaussian isoperimetric inequality (Theorem 5) applied with A = ∪j 6=iBj and a = a6=i, we have
ν(Bi→(η)) + ν(∪j 6=iBj) ≥ Φ(a6=i + ω−1(η)), i.e., ν(Bi→) ≥ Φ(a6=i + ω−1(η)) − Φ(a6=i). As
Bi→ are disjoint for different i, we have
ν(∪iBi→(η)) ≥
K∑
i=1
(Φ(a6=i + ω−1(η))− Φ(a6=i)) .
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The proof of inequality (2) of the main text then follows by using P(Ci→) ≥ ν(Bi→).
To prove inequality (3), observe that if P(Ci) ≤ 12 for all i, then P(∪j 6=iCj) ≥ 12 for all i. Then we
use the bound (8) to get,
P(∪iCi→(η)) ≥
K∑
i=1
(Φ(Φ−1(P(∪j 6=iCj)) + η)− P(∪j 6=iCj))
≥
K∑
i=1
(1− (1− P(∪j 6=iCj))
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2 − P(∪j 6=iCj))
= (1−
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2)
K∑
i=1
(1− P(∪j 6=iCj))
= 1−
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2 .
For the bound (4) that makes explicit the dependence on the number of classes, we simply use the
more explicit bound in (9).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let x = g(z) ∈ X and x′ ∈ X . Let z∗ be such that f˜(x′) = f(g(z∗)). By definition of f˜ ,
we have ‖x′ − g(z∗)‖ ≤ ‖x′ − g(z)‖. As such, using the triangle inequality, we get
‖g(z)− g(z∗)‖ ≤ ‖g(z)− x′‖+ ‖x′ − g(z∗)‖
≤ 2‖g(z)− x′‖ .
Taking the minimum over all x′ such that f˜(x) 6= f˜(x′), we obtain
rin(x) ≤ 2runc(x).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We use the same notations as in the proof of Theorem 1: let Bi(f) = g−1(Ci(f)) and
Bi(h) = g
−1(Ci(h)), and let
Bi→ = {z ∈ Bi(f) ∪Bi(h) : dist(x,Bi(f) ∩Bi(h)) ≤ ω−1(η)}.
where the notation B stands for the complement of B.
Note that Bi(f) ∪ Bi(h) = Bi(f) ∩Bi(h). We have ν(Bi(f) ∩ Bi(h)) ≥ ν(Bi(f)) − δ =
1− ν(Bi(f))− δ ≥ 12 . Thus, using the Gaussian isoperimetric inequality with A = Bi(f) ∩Bi(h),
we obtain
ν(Bi→) + ν(Bi(f) ∩Bi(h)) ≥ 1−
(
1− ν(Bi(f) ∩Bi(h))
)√pi
2
e−η
2/2,
where we also used inequality (8). As a result,
ν(Bi→) ≥ (1− ν(Bi(f) ∩Bi(h))(1−
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2)
≥ ν(Bi(f))(1−
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2) .
Now assume that z ∈ Bi→ but also z ∈ Bi(f) ∩ Bi(h). Then it is classified as i for both f
and h. In addition, the condition z ∈ Bi→ ensures that there exists z′ ∈ Bi(f) ∩ Bi(h) such
that ‖z − z′‖2 ≤ ω−1(η). Setting v = g(z′) − g(z), we have that f(g(z) + v) 6= f(g(z)) and
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h(g(z) + v) 6= h(g(z)) and ‖v‖ ≤ ω(‖z − z′‖) ≤ η. As such it suffices to show that the set
Bi→ ∩ (Bi(f) ∩Bi(h)) has sufficiently large measure. Indeed, we have
ν(Bi→ ∩ (Bi(f) ∩Bi(h)))
≥ ν(Bi→)− ν(Bi(f) ∩Bi(h))− ν(Bi(f) ∩Bi(h)) .
Summing over i, we get
K∑
i=1
ν(Bi→ ∩ (Bi(f) ∩Bi(h))) ≥ 1−
√
pi
2
e−η
2/2 − 2δ ,
because
∑K
i=1 ν(Bi(f) ∩Bi(h)) + ν(Bi(f) ∩Bi(h)) = 2 · ν {f ◦ g(z) 6= h ◦ g(z)} ≤ 2δ.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We first treat the case δ = 0. Given z we denote by rZ(z) =
min {‖r‖2 : f(g(z + r)) 6= f(g(z))}. Then it is easy to see that rin(g(z)) ≤ ω(rZ(z)). As
such we have Ex[rin(x)] = Ez[rin(g(z))] ≤ Ez[ω(rZ(z))] ≤ ω(Ez[rZ(z)]). Now we have
Ez[rZ(z)] =
∫ ∞
0
Pz[rZ(z) ≥ η]dη.
Using a bound similar to Theorem 1 applied to rZ we get
Ez[rZ(z)] ≤
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
K∑
i=1
Φ(a 6=i + η)− Φ(a 6=i)
)
dη
=
K∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(−a6=i − η)dη
where in the equality, we used the fact that 1 =
∑K
i=1(1−Φ(a6=i)). Now observe that for any a ∈ R,∫ ∞
0
Φ(−a− η)dη =
∫ ∞
a
∫ −u
−∞
e−t
2/2
√
2pi
dtdu
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ ∞
a
1t≤−udu
)
e−t
2/2
√
2pi
dt
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(−t− a)1a≤−t e
−t2/2
√
2pi
dt
=
e−a
2/2
√
2pi
− aΦ(−a).
As a result,
Ez[rZ(z)] ≤
K∑
i=1
−a6=iΦ(−a6=i) + e
−a26=i/2√
2pi
This establishes the first inequality.
Assuming now that the classes are equiprobable, i.e., a6=i = Φ−1(1− 1/K) =: a(K) for all i we get
that
E[rin(x)] ≤ ω
(
−a(K)2 + K√
2pi
e−a(K)
2/2
)
.
Using the bound (10) on a(K) we get:
E[rin(x)] ≤ ω
(√
2 log(K)−
√
2 log(K)− log(4pi log(K))
)
= ω
(
log(4pi log(K))√
2 log(K) +
√
2 log(K)− log(4pi log(K))
)
≤ ω
(
log(4pi log(K))√
2 log(K)
)
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Figure 3: Left: Illustration of checkerboard example. Right: Lower bound on robustness as a function
of η for the general result in Theorem 1 (blue curve) and the checkerboard example in Eq. 11 (red
curve).
We assume now that g is such that W (g∗(ν), µ) ≤ δ, where W denotes the Wasserstein distance in
(X , ‖ · ‖). Let (X,X ′) be a coupling with X ∼ µ and X ′ ∼ g∗(ν). We will construct a random
variable X ′′ such that almost surely X ′′ and X are classified differently. We define X ′′ = X ′ if X
and X ′ are classified differently and otherwise X ′′ = X ′ + ~r∗(X ′) where ~r∗(X ′) is defined to be a
vector of minimum norm such that X ′ + ~r∗(X ′) and X ′ are classified differently. Then we have
E
x∼µrunc(x)
≤ E‖X −X ′′‖
= E(1f(X)6=f(X′)‖X −X ′‖) + E(1f(X)=f(X′)‖X − (X ′ + ~r∗(X ′))‖)
≤ E‖X −X ′‖+ E‖~r∗(X ′))‖ .
By choosing a coupling such that W (g∗(ν), ν) = E‖X −X ′‖, we get E‖X −X ′‖ ≤ δ. In addition,
E‖~r∗(X ′))‖ ≤ Exrin(x). The statement therefore follows.
B Toy example: tightness of Theorem 1
As an illustration to Remark 4, we explicitly show through a toy example that a classifier which is not
linear in the Z-space can be significantly less robust than a linear one.
Example 1 (Checkerboard class partitions). Assume that B1 = g−1(C1) and B2 = g−1(C2) are
given by:
• B1 = {(z1, . . . , zd) :
∑d
i=1 bzic mod 2 = 0},
• B2 = Rd −B1.
See Fig. 3a for an illustration. Then, we have
P (z ∈ B1 and dist(z,B2) ≤ η) + P (z ∈ B2 and dist(z,B1) ≤ η) ≥ 1− (1− η)d. (11)
Fig 3b compares the general bound in Theorem 1 to Eq. (11). As can be seen, in the checkerboard
partition example, the probability of fooling converges much quicker to 1 (wrt η) than the general
result in Theorem 1. Hence, a classifier that creates many disconnected classification regions can be
much more vulnerable to perturbations than a linear classifier in the latent space.
Proof. We have ν(B1) = ν(B2) = 12 . Let z ∈ Rd in B2 be such that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d},
zi−bzic ∈ [0, η)∪ (1− η, 1), then z− ηei ∈ B1 or z+ ηei ∈ B1, and thus z is at distance at most η
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fromB1. As a result, if z is at distance> η fromB1, then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, zi−bzic ∈ [η, 1−η].
As a result,
Pz(z ∈ B2,dist(z,B1) > η)
≤ Pz(z ∈ B2,∀i, zi − bzic ∈ [η, 1− η])
=
1
√
2pi
d
∑
(j1,...,jd)∈Zd,
j1+···+jd mod 2=1
∫ j1+1−η
j1+η
dz1· · ·
∫ jd+1−η
jd+η
dzde
−
∑
i z
2
i
2 .
Now observe that for any j ∈ Z, as the function z 7→ e−z2/2 is monotone on the interval [j, j + 1]
(nondecreasing if j < 0 and nonincreasing if j ≥ 0). Thus, we have ∫ j+1−η
j+η
e−
z2
2 dz ≤ (1 −
η)
∫ j+1
j
e−
z2
2 dz, when η ≤ 12 . As a result,
Pz(z ∈ B2,dist(z,B1) > η)
≤ 1√
2pi
d
(1− η)d
∑
(j1,...,jd)∈Zd,∑
i ji mod 2=1
∫ j1+1
j1
dz1· · ·
∫ jd+1
jd
dzde
−
∑
i z
2
i
2
= (1− η)dPz(z ∈ B2)
=
1
2
(1− η)d .
With the same reasoning, Pz(z ∈ B1,dist(z,B2) > η) ≤ 12 (1− η)d and gives inequality (11).
C Experimental results
C.1 Details of the used models
For the SVHN dataset, we resize the images to 64 × 64. For the generative model, we use the
PyTorch implementation of DCGAN available on https://github.com/pytorch/examples/
blob/master/dcgan/main.py using the default parameters for architecture and optimization. The
2-layer LeNet classifier has the following architecture:
Conv(5, 2, 16)→ ReLU→ MaxPool(4)
→ Conv(5, 2, 32)→ ReLU→ MaxPool(4)→ FC(10),
where the parameters of Conv are kernel size, padding and number of filters, respectively. We
used the ResNet18 and ResNet101 architectures available on https://github.com/kuangliu/
pytorch-cifar/blob/master/models/resnet.py, with a kernel size of 5 for Conv1 and a
stride of 2. For all 3 architectures, we used SGD with a learning rate of 0.01, momentum of 0.9,
batch size of 100. To solve the problem in Eq. 12, we use gradient descent (for the maximization of
‖g(z)− g(z′)‖2) with learning rate 0.1 for 1, 000 steps. The upper bound was computed based on
100 samples of z.
For the CIFAR-10 experiment, we use a similar DCGAN generative model. The VGG-
type architecture has 11 conv layers, each of kernel size 3, with number of output channels
(64, 64, 128, 128, 128, 256, 256, 256, 512, 512, 512) and stride (1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1). Each
conv layer is followed by BatchNorm and a ReLU function. For the WideResNet ar-
chitecture, we use the WRN-28-10 model available on https://github.com/szagoruyko/
wide-residual-networks. SGD is used with learning rate 0.1, momentum 0.9, and batchsize 100.
For the adversarially trained Wide ResNet with PGD training, we have used the model of [10].
C.2 Numerical evaluation of the upper bound
To evaluate numerically the upper bound, we have used a probabilistic version of the modulus
of continuity, where the property is not required to be satisfied for all z, z′, but rather with high
probability, and accounted for the error probability in the bound. Specifically, while the modulus
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of continuity function is given by ω(δ) = maxz maxz′:‖z−z′‖2≤δ ‖g(z) − g(z′)‖2, we use in the
experiments a probabilistic version of the modulus of continuity, given by:
ωκ(δ) = min
{
α : P
(
sup
z′:‖z−z′‖2≤δ
‖g(z)− g(z′)‖2 ≥ α
)
≤ κ
}
. (12)
Then, the following bound holds for any δ, κ:
P (rin(x) ≥ ωκ(δ)) ≤ κ+ P (∃r : ‖r‖2 ≥ δ : f(g(z + r)) 6= f(g(z))) .︸ ︷︷ ︸
1− probability in Theorem 1 with ω identity.
(13)
For example, when κ is set to 0, we recover the exact bounds in Theorem 1. When κ > 0, we have to
account for the use of a probabilistic definition of the modulus of continuity in the bound; this exactly
corresponds to the additive κ term in the probability in Eq. (13).
In practice, for a fixed target probability (set to 0.25 in the experiments of the main paper), it is
possible to choose the value of δ that yields the best bound, since Eq. (13) is valid for any δ. For
a fixed value of δ, we used gradient descent (until the loss function stabilizes) in order to solve the
optimization problem supz:‖z′−z‖2≤δ ‖g(z)− g(z′)‖. For a fixed value of δ, we hence summarize
the procedure used to evaluate the upper bound in Algorithm 1. We have used in practice 100 samples
to estimate the upper bound, for each value of δ. For any value of δ, Algorithm 1 provides an estimate
of the upper bound; such an estimate can be improved by using many different values of δ.
Algorithm 1 Numerical evaluation of the upper bound.
1: // input: δ, target probability pt.
2: // output: numerical upper bound.
3: p← pt − pu(δ). // pu(δ) is the probability from Theorem 1 with ω set to identity.
4: repeat: i = 1, . . .
5: Sample zi ∼ N (0, Id).
6: Compute si ← supz′:‖zi−z′‖2≤δ‖g(zi)− g(z′)‖.
7: until enough samples are taken
8: Use the above si to estimate α such that P˜ (si ≥ α) ≤ p, where P˜ is the empirical probability distribution.
return α.
C.3 Illustration of generated images
Fig. 4 illustrates generated images for SVHN, as well as corresponding perturbed images that fool a
ResNet-18 classifier (in-distribution robustness). Similarly, Fig. 5 illustrates examples of generated
images for CIFAR-10, as well as perturbed samples required to fool the VGG classifier, where
perturbed images are constrained to belong to the data distribution (i.e., in-distribution setting).
3 8 5 6 8 2
5 9 2 91 4
Figure 4: Examples of generated images with DCGAN for the SVHN dataset, and associated
perturbed images (in-distribution perturbations). For each pair of images, the left shows the original
image, and the right shows the perturbed image. The estimated label (using ResNet-18) of each
image is shown on top of each image.
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